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I.

INTRODUCTION

According to the Institute of Medicine, each year between
44,000 and 98,000 people die in hospitals as a result of medical
1
error. The ensuing costs of medical errors include patients’ lost
† J.D. Candidate 2006, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A., Psychology,
Augsburg College, 2000; Medical Specialist, Army National Guard, 1998-2001;
Corporal, United States Marine Corps, 1993-1997. Special thanks extended to
Shannon Gregory, Kathryn Gammelgaard, and Ginger Gammelgaard for their
continual encouragement and support.
1. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH AND QUALITY, HEALTH CARE COSTS,
AHRQ PUBLICATION NO. 02-P033 (2002), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/
costsfact.htm. “Even at the lowest number, medical errors would be the eighth
leading cause of death in this country, bypassing motor vehicle accidents, breast
cancer, and AIDS. About 7,000 people die from medication errors alone, which is
about 16% more deaths than can be attributed to work-related injuries.” Id.

1031

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2005

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 31, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 9
9GREGORY.DOC

1032

3/13/2005 4:16:24 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:3

income, disability, and health care, all of which may add up to $29
2
billion annually. As a result, some patients must live with serious
injuries for the rest of their lives. For example, a health care
provider’s failure to adequately monitor a mother’s pregnancy
3
resulted in her son being born with permanent brain damage.
That child suffers from cerebral palsy and significant physical,
cognitive, and behavioral difficulties that will endure for the rest of
4
his life.
Patients that are injured by physician negligence look to the
legal system to recover damages for the harms committed by those
5
physicians.
State tort law provides the legal foundation for
6
recovery in such medical malpractice lawsuits. The four types of
recoverable damages available in most medical malpractice lawsuits
7
8
9
10
are economic, noneconomic, punitive, and total damages. As
compared to economic damages, noneconomic damages are

2. QUALITY INTERAGENCY COORDINATION TASK FORCE, DOING WHAT COUNTS
FOR PATIENT SAFETY: FEDERAL ACTIONS TO REDUCE MEDICAL ERRORS AND THEIR
IMPACT (2000), at http://www.quic.gov/report/index.htm.
3. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43,
55-56 (Neb. 2003).
4. Id.
5. Jason Leo, Case Note, Torts—Medical Malpractice: The Legislature’s Attempt to
Prevent Cases Without Merit Denies Valid Claims: Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1399, 1400 (2000).
6. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: IMPLICATIONS OF
RISING PREMIUMS ON ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE, GAO-03-0836, 2 n.1 (2003)
[hereinafter IMPLICATIONS]. “Medical malpractice lawsuits are generally based on
principles of tort law. A tort is a wrongful act or omission by an individual that
causes harm to another individual. Typically, a legal claim of malpractice would be
based on a claim that the negligence of a provider caused injury and the injured
party would seek damages.” Id.
7. Economic damages are defined as “those designed to compensate the
plaintiff for his or her out-of-pocket expenses. These include any tangible
economic loss, such as past and future medical expenses, costs of follow-up
treatment, and lost wages.” Christopher S. Kozak, A Review of Federal Malpractice
Tort Reform Alternatives, 19 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 599, 621 n.98 (1995).
8. Noneconomic damages are defined as “the portion of the award that
compensates for ‘pain and suffering.’” Id. n.99. “Because there exists no basis by
which to measure the mental and physical anguish of an injury in its
rehabilitation, these damages tend to be the most unpredictable.” Id.
9. Punitive damages are defined as a tool to “punish tortfeasers for their
outrageous conduct and to deter similar future conduct.” Id. n.100. Punitive
damages are “rarely used in malpractice cases unless the physician is found to have
acted with willful indifference to or in deliberate disregard of the patient’s needs.”
Id.
10. Id. at 621.
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difficult to quantify and may create unpredictable damage awards.
Medical malpractice insurers, physicians, and medical associations
have therefore blamed unlimited noneconomic damages for the
12
rising costs of medical malpractice liability insurance. However,
capping noneconomic damages limits the compensation available
13
for a patient’s very real injuries, undermining the opportunity for
14
an aggrieved person to be made whole.
The threat of a medical malpractice insurance “crisis”
continues to influence legislators, health care providers, and
15
insurers to encourage tort reform. In 2003 alone, forty-one states
introduced legislation that either proposed or changed caps on
16
noneconomic damages for medical malpractice awards.
The
primary focus of most legislative tort reform efforts generally
11. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: MULTIPLE FACTORS
HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO INCREASED PREMIUM RATES, GAO-03-702, 42 (2003)
[hereinafter MULTIPLE FACTORS]. Even though noneconomic damages are
difficult to quantify, the Illinois Supreme Court determined that “it does not
follow that the difficulty in quantifying compensatory damages for noneconomic
injuries is alleviated by imposing an arbitrary limitation or cap in all cases.” Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076 (Ill. 1997).
12. See MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 8. “In response to concerns over
rising premium rates, physicians, medical associations, and insurers have pushed
for state and federal legislation that would, among other things, limit the amount
of damages paid out on medical malpractice claims.” Id.
13. ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, FACT SHEET: OPPOSE S. 11: THE
SAME
OLD
STORY,
available
at
http://www.atla.org/consumer
mediaresources/tier3/ press_room/facts/medmal/s11.aspx (last visited Jan. 14,
2004). Real injuries that are entitled to compensation include: “loss of a limb or
sight, the loss of mobility, the loss of fertility, excruciating pain and permanent
and severe disfigurement. . . . [and] the loss of a child or a spouse.” Id.
14. If $250,000 noneconomic damage caps were imposed, then “victims
[would] receive arbitrary compensation for the horrendous and oftentimes
permanent injuries they suffer, rather than allowing a jury to determine the
appropriate level of compensation in each individual case.” Help Efficient,
Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th
Cong., Comments (2003).
15. See Kozak, supra note 7, at 600; see also Mitchell S. Berger, Following the
Doctor’s Orders—Caps on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Cases, 22
RUTGERS L.J. 173, 174 (1991). “To reduce malpractice claims payments and
insurance premiums and for other reasons, some have advocated changes to tort
laws, such as placing caps on the amount of damages or limits on the amount of
attorney fees that may be paid under a malpractice lawsuit. These changes are
collectively referred to as ‘tort reforms.’” IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 2 n.1.
16. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, HIAA REPORTS ON STATE
HEALTH INSURANCE LEGISLATION (2003), available at http://www.hiaa.org/news/
newsitem.cfm?ContentID=24412 (on file with author). In late 2003, HIAA merged
with AAHP to form America’s Health Insurance Plans (AHIP). Further
information can be found at http://www.ahip.org.
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17

centers upon capping patient damages. Capping noneconomic
18
damages, however, has always been highly controversial. In 2004,
physicians and health insurers successfully made medical liability
19
reform a presidential campaign issue.
The vice-presidential
candidates first debated the issue and the presidential candidates,
President George W. Bush and Senator John F. Kerry, followed
20
suit. In fact, one survey indicated that eighty-seven percent of
Americans viewed the presidential candidates’ health care
21
proposals to be influential in determining who to vote for.
This note explores the history behind the rising costs of
medical malpractice insurance rates and the responsive state
22
legislative proposals to limit noneconomic damages. The current
state of health care liability and the recent federal proposals that
23
include caps on noneconomic damages are then discussed. This
note analyzes the reasons why the federal government should not
cap noneconomic damages, primarily because: (1) states are better
able to regulate health care, (2) noneconomic damages are not the
determinate cause of rising medical malpractice insurance rates,
and (3) caps infringe on equal protection guarantees by limiting
24
compensation of medical malpractice victims.
This note
highlights the current state of health care liability in Minnesota and
how the Minnesota legislature has dealt with rising medical

17. Kozak, supra note 7, at 619.
18. Berger, supra note 15, at 183.
19. Professional Liability: GOP Senators Fall Short of Votes Needed to Start
Consideration of Malpractice Bill, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (July 10,
2003).
20. Joel B. Finkelstein, Health Care Emerges as a Major Issue in 2004 Election,
AMEDNEWS.COM (April 12, 2004), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/
2004/04/12/gvsd0412.htm. Transcripts of all presidential and vice-presidential
debates are available on The Washington Post website, available at
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/politics/elections/2004/debates/ (last visited
Dec. 2, 2004). The vice-presidential candidates were first to raise the issue of
medical liability tort reform: Vice-president Dick Cheney stated, “[W]hat we need
to do is cap non-economic damages.” John Edwards responded, “We want to put
more responsibility on the lawyers to require . . . independent experts to
determine if the case is serious and meritorious before it can be filed.” Transcript:
Vice Presidential Debate, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, Ohio at 4243 (Oct. 5, 2004), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv/politics/debatereferee/debate_1005.html.
21. Finkelstein, supra note 20.
22. See infra Parts II, III.
23. See infra Part III.A-B.
24. See infra Part III.B.
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25

malpractice insurance costs.
Finally, this note concludes that
noneconomic damage caps are not the panacea to the “medical
liability crisis.” States should therefore continue to regulate the
26
health care industry through other reform measures.
II. HISTORY
The existence of a medical liability crisis and its possible
underlying causes are controversial topics.
The General
Accounting Office (GAO), an investigative arm of Congress, once
acknowledged that “[h]ealth care providers have suffered through
three medical malpractice insurance ‘crises’ in the past thirty
27
years.”
During the 1970s, the first crisis occurred as medical
28
malpractice suits reached their peak. Medical malpractice liability
insurance rates climbed and resulted in some physicians being
29
unable to obtain adequate coverage.
After a brief period of
stability, medical malpractice premium rates rapidly increased
30
again in the 1980s and later in the 1990s. The possible causes of
the medical malpractice insurance increases are always subject to
31
debate.
One plausible explanation is that the fear of possible medical
malpractice liability causes physicians to practice “defensive
medicine,” which occurs when physicians perform costly additional
32
tests or unnecessary procedures to avoid possible litigation.
“Defensive medicine” may exist, but it is difficult to measure its
33
effect on health care costs. Whatever the cause, rising medical
malpractice insurance rates often result in physicians not
performing high-risk procedures, moving to states with lower

25. See infra Part III.C.
26. See infra Part IV.
27. See MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 46.
28. Leo, supra note 5, at 1402. “[T]here were approximately ‘five medical
malpractice suits filed for every 10 doctors.’” Id. at 1402-03 (citations omitted).
29. Berger, supra note 15, at 175; Leo, supra note 5, at 1403.
30. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 1.
31. Berger, supra note 15, at 177. Physicians and insurers attributed rising
costs to both the quantity of suits filed and the size of damage awards, while
lawyers and consumer groups blamed excessive insurance profits and the medical
profession’s inability to eliminate substandard practitioners. Id. The decline in
the U.S. stock market in the early 1970s also contributed to the rising costs. Id. at
177-78.
32. Leo, supra note 5, at 1403.
33. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 27.
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34

insurance rates, or retiring.
This effect has spurred debatable
concern as to the accessibility of health care, especially in rural
35
areas.
In response, nearly every state has passed tort reform
36
legislation. Reform has included varying measures: from statutes
that shorten the statute of limitations to statutes that limit the
37
damages a plaintiff can recover in medical malpractice suits.
California was one of the first states to enact legislation that
38
specifically limited noneconomic damages. California’s Medical
39
Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975 (MICRA) limited
noneconomic damages to $250,000 and is still in place today,
40
despite having never been adjusted for inflation.
Twenty-six states followed California’s initiative and enacted
41
caps on noneconomic damages between the years 1975 and 1995.
34. Id. at 1; Leo, supra note 5, at 1403; MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION,
ISSUE BRIEF—MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, at http://www.mnmed.org/advocacy
News/tpmedical malpractice.cfm (last updated Jan. 17, 2003) [hereinafter
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE].
35. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 38 (explaining that the American Medical
Association questioned GAO’s finding that access problems were not widespread
based on GAO’s work in five states, which were among the most often-cited
examples of “crisis states”).
36. Berger, supra note 15, at 179 (explaining the results of the crisis in the
1970s and the states’ response of tort reform to preserve health care access at a
reasonable cost); Leo, supra note 5, at 1403-04.
37. Leo, supra note 5, at 1404.
38. AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, IMPACT ON STATE LAWS LIMITING
MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS, TABLE 1A:
SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS IN STATES WITH CAPS ON MALPRACTICE AWARDS (2002)
[hereinafter TABLE 1A], at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/torttab1a.htm
(showing that California, Indiana, and Louisiana imposed noneconomic damage
caps in medical malpractice suits during 1975).
39. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (1975). The California Supreme Court
determined that the California legislature was responding to the rising cost of
medical malpractice insurance that posed serious problems for California’s health
care system, which “threaten[ed] to curtail the availability of medical care in some
parts of the state and creat[ed] the very real possibility that many doctors would
practice without insurance, leaving patients who might be injured by such doctors
with the prospect of uncollectible judgments.” Fein v. Permanente Med. Group,
695 P.2d 665, 680 (Cal. 1985).
40. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost, Timely Health Care (HEALTH) Act
of 2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong., Comments (2003) (noting that California’s cap was
enacted in 1975 and has never been adjusted for inflation, which, if adjusted for
inflation, would be $1,500,000 in 2003).
41. TABLE 1A, supra note 38; AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, IMPACT ON
STATE LAWS LIMITING MALPRACTICE AWARDS ON GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF
PHYSICIANS, TABLE 1B: SUPPLY OF PHYSICIANS IN STATE WITHOUT CAPS ON
MALPRACTICE AWARDS FOR NONECONOMIC DAMAGES (2002) [hereinafter TABLE 1B],
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However, courts in seven of those states overturned the capping
42
legislation. A principle reason for overturning the legislation was
that limiting recovery in medical malpractice lawsuits by itself is an
arbitrary classification that violates plaintiffs’ constitutional
43
guarantee to equal protection.
After courts overturned the
legislation, some state legislatures persisted in again passing
capping legislation for a second time, but the courts once again
44
rejected their attempts. Consequently, by the end of 2000 only
45
twenty states had noneconomic damages caps in place.
In 2002, Mississippi, Nevada, and Ohio continued the
legislative push and passed legislation that imposed noneconomic
46
damage caps. In 2003, several additional state legislatures either
introduced or changed limits on noneconomic damages in medical
malpractice suits: forty-one states introduced bills, eleven of which
47
passed the bills proposed. For example, in June of 2003, Texas

at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/tortcaps/torttab1b.htm (listing Alabama,
Alaska, California, Colorado, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin as states enacting caps between 1975 and 1995).
42. TABLE 1B, supra note 41 (listing Alabama, Florida, Illinois, Ohio, Oregon,
Texas, and Washington as overturning caps on noneconomic damages). Florida,
Ohio, and Texas have since passed legislation capping noneconomic damages.
Id.
43. For example, the Illinois Supreme Court overturned a $500,000
noneconomic damage cap on constitutional grounds in 1976 and did so again in
1997. Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass’n, 347 N.E.2d 736 (Ill. 1976); Best v.
Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997). In Wright, the plaintiff
successfully argued that noneconomic caps “arbitrarily classified, and
unreasonably discriminated against, the most seriously injured victims of medical
malpractice, but has not limited the recovery of those victims who suffer moderate
or minor injuries.” Wright, 347 N.E.2d at 741.
44. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM (2003), at
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/7861.html [hereinafter MEDICAL
LIABILITY REFORM].
45. TABLE 1A, supra note 38 (listing Alaska, California, Colorado, Hawaii,
Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, Virginia, West
Virginia, and Wisconsin).
46. TABLE 1B, supra note 41.
47. HEALTH INSURANCE ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, STATE ISSUES TRACKING
REPORT: MIDYEAR REVIEW at 4 (2003), at http://member ship.hiaa.org/pdfs/
communications/030729statetrack.pdf. Medical malpractice and tort reform have
emerged as high profile issues in 2003. Id. The most significant health insurance
issues facing state legislatures during the first six months of 2003 were “mandated
benefits, medical malpractice reform, privacy, and prescription drug coverage.”
Id.
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Governor Rick Perry (R) signed legislation that imposes a $250,000
cap on noneconomic damages for health care providers and health
48
On September 13, 2003, Texas voters
care institutions.
subsequently approved an amendment to the Texas Constitution
that authorizes the legislature to set limits on noneconomic
49
damage awards.
Similarly, in August of 2003, after months of
debate, Florida Governor Jeb Bush (R) signed a bill that provides
tiered capping of noneconomic damages at $500,000 for physicians
50
and $750,000 for hospitals. In May of 2004, eight additional state
51
legislatures continued the pursuit of tort reform measures. As of
publication, a grand total of twenty-five states have effectively
passed noneconomic damage caps of varying amounts applicable to
52
medical malpractice suits.
III. THE CURRENT STATE OF HEALTH CARE LIABILITY
The American Medical Association (AMA) continually
evaluates the state of health care liability in the United States by
53
analyzing several independent sources of information. The AMA
48. Texas: Governor Signs a Bill, Calls it “Most Sweeping in the Nation,” in BNA’S
HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (June 20, 2003).
49. Texas: Voters Approve Constitution Change that Clears Way for Damages Caps
Law, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 16, 2003). Kathy Walt,
spokesman for Governor Rick Perry, said that the “approval of Proposition 12 also
has national significance. . . . The governor expects President Bush and Congress
will view Texas as the model for passing meaningful medical liability and general
tort reform at the federal level.” Id.
50. Drew Douglas, Florida: Gov. Bush Signs Malpractice Reform Bill: Trial Bar
Vows Constitutional Challenge, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Aug. 15, 2003).
Prior to passing the bill the House pushed for a $250,000 cap while the Senate
opposed caps, but later modified its stance to include cap proposals within the bill
that ranged from $500,000-$750,000. Id. “The cap was probably the most
contentious part of the negotiations while formulating this legislative package.”
Id.
51. TANYA ALBERT, 3 STATES PASS TORT REFORM; OTHERS STILL WAITING (June
14, 2004), at http://www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2004/06/14/gvsa0614.htm.
New Jersey, Ohio, and Oklahoma passed tort reform measures, while Alaska,
Connecticut, Iowa, Missouri, and New Hampshire rejected tort reform. Id.
52. TABLE 1A, supra note 38; TABLE 1B, supra note 41; Adam D. Glassman, The
Imposition of Federal Caps in Medical Malpractice Liability Actions: Will They Cure the
Current Crisis in Health Care?, 37 AKRON L. REV. 417, 432-58 (2004) (listing the
individual state laws pertaining to medical liability).
53. Memorandum from Daniel Blaney-Koen, Field Communications Officer,
AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION (June 2002) (on file with author) (listing
numerous sources analyzed, such as the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, Agency for HealthCare Research and Quality, General Accounting
Office, and the Joint Economic Commission of the U.S. Congress).
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considers two primary factors in determining the scope and depth
of “America’s Liability Crisis:” (1) the magnitude of decreasing
access to health care and (2) physicians ceasing certain high-risk
54
procedures such as delivering babies and emergency care. As of
January 2005, the AMA indicated that twenty states were actually in
“medical liability crisis,” while twenty-four states showed “problem
55
signs.”
The AMA categorized California, along with Colorado,
New Mexico, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Louisiana, as the only “OK”
56
states in the area of medical liability.
At the federal level, during the 2003 legislative session, federal
legislative proposals attempted to parallel California’s cap of
57
$250,000 and preempt state laws governing health care lawsuits.
However, these proposals ignored the fact that following the
California legislature’s enactment of noneconomic damage caps,
California’s malpractice insurance premiums continued to increase
through 1988 to an “all-time high” that was 450% higher than in
58
California ultimately
1975, the year that MICRA was enacted.
passed insurance reform in 1988, which contributed to the
59
stabilization of medical malpractice insurance rates.
Thus, the
54. Id. (considering the additional factors of “[a] state’s legislative, legal, and
judicial climate; [a]ffordability and availability of professional liability insurance;
and [t]rend[s] of jury awards and settlements”).
55. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, AMERICA’S MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS: A
NATIONAL VIEW, at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/noindex/category/11871.html
(last updated Jan. 31, 2005) [hereinafter MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS] (showing
Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Mississippi, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming as states
in full-blown “medical liability crisis” and showing Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota,
Nebraska, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Virginia as states
showing “problem signs”). The AMA does not explicitly define “problem signs,”
but the inferred meaning would be those states on the verge of being in “medical
liability crisis.” See id.
56. MEDICAL LIABILITY CRISIS, supra note 55.
57. Help Efficient, Accessible, Low-cost Timely Healthcare (HEALTH) Act of
2003, H.R. 5, 108th Cong., Comments (2003).
58. Glassman, supra note 52, at 459 (quoting THE FOUNDATION OF TAXPAYER
AND CONSUMER RIGHTS, HOW INSURANCE REFORM LOWERED DOCTORS’ MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE RATES IN CALIFORNIA: AND HOW MALPRACTICE CAPS FAIL, (March 7,
2003), available at http://www.consumerwatchdog.com).
59. Id.; see also ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, THE TRUTH ABOUT
CAPS- THEY DON’T WORK, at http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/
Tier3/press_room/FACTS/medmal/capsfactsheet.aspx (last visited Dec. 2, 2004).
The California Proposition 103 required prior approval of insurance rates and also
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reasonable conclusion is that insurance reform, not noneconomic
damage caps, is what caused the medical malpractice insurance
rates to decline, making California an “OK” state in the area of
60
medical liability.
The federal proposals based on California’s
legislation similarly ignored the fact that Massachusetts, Missouri,
and West Virginia are all in “medical liability crisis” despite having
61
noneconomic damage caps in place since 1986.
A. Federal Proposals to Limit Noneconomic Damages in the Twenty-First
Century
Passing federal legislation to cap noneconomic damages has
proven to be a continual battle. In 2000, the revised Health Care
Liability Reform Act of 1997 was first introduced in the House of
62
The proposed legislation was intended to
Representatives.
impose certain requirements on health care liability claims,
63
including a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages. The bill
was referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary but was not
64
reintroduced back to the House. The following year, the House
of Representatives tried again and introduced the Medical
65
Malpractice Rx Act. This bill also proposed a $250,000 limit on
66
noneconomic damages.
The Medical Malpractice Rx Act was
referred to the subcommittee on Health and Environment but was
67
once again not reintroduced back to the House.
The Help Efficient, Accessible, Low Cost, Timely Health Care
68
Act of 2002 (HEALTH Act of 2002) was introduced in the House
69
of Representatives on April 25, 2002. The HEALTH Act of 2002
stated goals of improving accessibility to health care and the quality
70
of medical care by reducing the burden of medical liability. This
required the Commissioner of Insurance to request a public hearing if a
commercial carrier requests a rate increase of greater than 15%. MULTIPLE
FACTORS, supra note 11, at 59.
60. See Glassman, supra note 52, at 459.
61. TABLE 1B, supra note 41.
62. H.R. 1091, 105th Cong. (2000).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. H.R. 2242, 106th Cong. (2001).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002).
69. Melissa A. Wojtylak et al., Recent Developments in Medicine and Law, 38 TORT
TRIAL & INS. PRACT. L.J. 549, 551 (2003).
70. Id. The purposes of the proposed legislation are listed as improving
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proposed legislation similarly limited noneconomic damages at
71
$250,000, regardless of the number of defendants a plaintiff sues.
The HEALTH Act of 2002 was designed to preempt state laws
concerning medical liability claims unless the applicable state law
72
provided greater protection for health care providers. The House
of Representatives passed the HEALTH Act of 2002, but after two
73
readings in the Senate the Act was referred to the Judiciary
74
Committee and never voted on.
On March 21, 2003, The HEALTH Act of 2003 was read for
75
the first time in the House of Representatives. The HEALTH Act
of 2003 stated the same goals of improving access to health care as
well as improving medical care by reducing the burden the liability
76
system weighs on the health care system.
Once again, the
77
proposed cap on noneconomic damages was set at $250,000. The
Health Act of 2003 eventually passed in the House, but again was
78
only read twice in the Senate and never voted on.
On June 28, 2003, the Senate Republicans introduced the
79
Patients First Act of 2003.
The Patients First Act of 2003 was
intended to increase access to quality health care by reducing
80
liability cost effects. The bill was very similar to the HEALTH Act
of 2003 in that both would have imposed a $250,000 cap on
81
noneconomic damages in health care lawsuits. The Patients First
Act, however, hit a political impasse when on July 7, Senate
Republicans attempted to bring the legislation to the floor but the
82
Democrats objected to the motion to proceed the bill.
availability of health care where health care liability claims have contributed to
decreasing availability of services, reducing health care liability insurance costs,
ensuring adequate compensation for patients with meritorious injury claims, and
improving fairness and cost efficiency of the alternative dispute resolution system
by reducing uncertainty of damage awards. Id.
71. Id. at 552.
72. Id.
73. S. 2793, 107th Cong. (2002).
74. H.R. 4600, 107th Cong. (2002); S. 2793, 107th Cong. (2002).
75. H.R. 5, 108th Cong. (2003).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. S. 607, 108th Cong. (2003).
79. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003).
80. Id.
81. Elizabeth White, Professional Liability: No Senate Action on Malpractice, as
Republicans, Democrats Trade Blame, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 9, 2003).
82. Elizabeth White, Professional Liability: Senate Democrats Object to GOP
Bringing Damage Caps Bill to the Floor, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 8,
2003) [hereinafter White].
Senators voted along party lines except two
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Federal legislative activity on the issue continued when the
House Republicans introduced the HEALTH Act of 2004 on May 5,
83
As before, limits on noneconomic damages were set at
2004.
84
$250,000. On May 12, the House successfully passed the bill by a
85
The bill was never voted on in the Senate,
vote of 229-197.
however, the HEALTH Act of 2005 has rekindled the proposed
86
$250,000 noneconomic damage cap in any health care lawsuit.
The critical fate of capping noneconomic damages is in the hands
of the 109th Congress.
Some Republicans and Democrats are able to agree that rising
malpractice premiums are causing health care accessibility
87
problems; however, they are unable to agree on a solution.
Generally, Republican lawmakers continue to focus on capping
damages and other limitations on medical lawsuits, while
Democrats focus on tightening rules for medical malpractice
88
insurance carriers. Medical liability reform legislation therefore
continues to be shut down in the Senate, but the controversy of
capping noneconomic damages continues.
B. The Federal Government Should Not Impose Caps on Noneconomic
Damages
1.

States Regulate Health Care

Legislators continually take sides about whether the federal
government should take over traditionally state regulated health
care reform. On one side of the debate, Senate Republican
Conference Chairman Rick Santorum (R.-Pa.) stated that health
care reform is a federal matter because rising medical malpractice
Republicans who voted with the Democrats: Lindsey O. Graham (S.C.) and
Richard A. Selby (Ala.). Id. Three Democratic Senators were missing for the vote.
Id.
83. H.R. 4280, 108th Cong. (2004).
84. Id.
85. Id. On May 13, the bill was laid on the table and its text was appended to
H.R. 4279. Id.
86. H.R. 4279, 108th Cong. (2004). This bill was received in the Senate on
May 17, 2004, read twice, placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar, and never
voted on. Id. New capping legislation was introduced on February 2, 2005 and
has been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary and the Committee on
Energy and Commerce. H.R. 534, 109th Cong. (2005). Related bills have also
been introduced in the Senate. S. 366, 367, & 354, 109th Cong. (2005).
87. White, supra note 82.
88. Id.
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insurance premiums take a financial toll on the federal health care
89
The Patients First Act
programs of Medicare and Medicaid.
likewise stated that the health care and insurance industries are
90
affecting interstate commerce and federal spending.
On the
other side of the debate, some members of Congress disagree that
health care reform is a federal issue because tort reform proposals
are historically state legislative decisions that are not governed by
91
the federal legislature. The U.S. Supreme Court has affirmed that
92
Congress cannot “cavalierly pre-empt state-law causes of action.”
The American Bar Association’s Committee on Medical
Professional Liability also contends that medical professional
liability issues, including damage caps in medical malpractice cases,
93
should remain “tort-based and state-based.”
Indeed, the states
94
have had authority over medical liability laws for over 200 years.
This is because each individual state considers unique factors in
95
addressing issues of health care lawsuits.
Thus, the individual
state is in the best position to determine which tort reform
measures most clearly address the health care matters within the
state.
The judiciary and legislative branches of the federal
government have upheld state regulatory powers in the area of
health care. The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized states as the
89. Id.
90. S. 11, 108th Cong. (2003). The Patients First Act of 2003 stated that the
health care and insurance industries affect interstate commerce by “contributing
to the high costs of health care and premiums for health care liability insurance
purchased by health care system providers.” Id. § 2(a)(2). Congress also found
that health care liability systems throughout the states have a “significant effect on
the amount, distribution, and use of Federal funds because of the large number of
individuals who receive health care benefits under programs operated or financed
by the Federal government.” Id. § 2(a)(3).
91. H.R. REP. NO. 108-32, pt. 2 at 39 (2003).
92. Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).
93. Douglas, supra note 50.
94. Letter from Robert D. Evans, American Bar Association, to the United
States House of Representatives, 108th Cong. (Mar. 10, 2003), at
http://www.abanet.org/poladv/letters/108th/mpl031003.html
[hereinafter
Evans]. The letter explained that the system of allowing states to regulate the
resolution of cases within their borders is the “hallmark of our American Justice
System.” Id. This is “[b]ecause of the role they have played, the states are the
repositories of experience and expertise in these matters.” Id.
95. Joyce E. Butler, Medicare: State Lawmakers’ Group Urges Congress to Adopt
Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 29, 2003)
(referring to the Law and Criminal Justice Committee’s resolution opposing the
federal government’s preemption of existing state law in medical malpractice
suits).
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preferred authority to handle health care accountability issues
because states traditionally regulate health care within their
96
borders. Furthermore, the Court has held that traditional state
regulation in the health care field would not be preempted by
federal law without a “clear manifestation of congressional
97
purpose.”
Congress has equally recognized in past federal
legislation that health care organizations are subject to a state’s
98
regulatory powers. States are separate sovereigns in the federal
system and tort remedies ought to remain within their historic
99
policing powers.
2.

Noneconomic Damage Caps Are Not the Determinant Factor

GAO determined that insurance companies’ increased losses
seem to be the greatest contributor to increased medical
100
malpractice insurance rates.
However, GAO was unable to
determine the effects of health care settlements, trial verdicts, and
economic and noneconomic damages on medical malpractice
101
insurance rates.
GAO concluded that there was not a
comprehensive source of information on the breakdown of
102
insurers’ losses between economic and noneconomic damages.
Factors other than noneconomic damages may therefore have
caused or contributed to the resultant increase in medical
103
malpractice insurance rates.
These other factors include the
104
presence of other tort reform measures, state laws regulating the
96. Evans, supra note 94. Robert D. Evans, in his letter to the United States
House of Representatives, cited both Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 237 (2000)
(holding that state law applies to mixed eligibility decisions by physicians and are
not fiduciary decisions under the federal Employee Retirement Income Security
Act (ERISA)) and Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 357 (2002)
(holding that the ERISA statute does not preempt the Illinois Health Maintenance
Organization Act).
97. Pegram, 530 U.S. at 237; see also Medtronic, 518 U.S. at 484.
98. See Rush, 536 U.S. at 356-67 (emphasizing that Congress recognized
HMOs as being subject to state regulation).
99. Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 894 (2000).
100. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 4.
101. Professional Liability: GAO Sees Claims Losses as Main Driver of Long-Term Rise
in Malpractice Premiums, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REP. (July 29, 2003); see also
MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 42-43 (concluding that the impact of “various
measures” and lack of data makes it impossible to “quantify the impact of a cap on
noneconomic damages on insurers’ losses”).
102. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 43.
103. Id. at 4.
104. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 11-12. GAO named other sorts of tort
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premium rate setting process, and certain market forces on the
107
insurance industry.
Analyzing and comparing data from various states is more
complicated than it appears. The Department of Health and
Human Services Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality
reported that states with noneconomic damages caps in health care
lawsuits have approximately twelve percent more physicians per
108
capita than states without caps. However, GAO contends that it is
difficult to compare states on the basis of whether or not they have
enacted caps because state tort reform and insurance reform laws
109
are dramatically different.
GAO recommends that future data
collection of frequency, severity, and cause of losses from medical
110
malpractice suits would allow for appropriate analysis.
However, the Department of Health and Human Services
blamed the “increasingly unpredictable, costly and slow litigation
111
system” for the high medical liability insurance premiums.
On
the contrary, the litigation system is just as costly to medical
malpractice insurers based on the significant expense to defend
medical malpractice claims, as compared to the small number of
112
successful claims that actually result in large jury awards.
reform provisions, which include abolishing collateral source payments, abolishing
“joint and several liability,” restricting the statute of limitations, allowing periodic
payment of damages, limiting attorney fees, requiring expert certification of
claims, and providing for greater use of arbitration. Id.
105. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 56-57 (explaining that statutory
requirements vary by state, but generally provide that “insurance rates be
adequate, not excessive, and not unfairly discriminatory”).
106. Id. at 4. From 1998 through 2001, interest rates fell on bonds that made
up about 80% of insurers’ investment portfolios. Id. “[A] decrease in investment
income meant that income from insurance premiums had to cover a large share of
insurers’ costs.” Id. Competition also encouraged offering low rates during times
of high investment returns, which did not completely cover their ultimate losses
for some insurers. Id.
107. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 7.
108. White, supra note 82.
109. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 43 (explaining that damage caps can
vary in amount, type of damages covered, and how the limitations apply).
110. Id. at 46. “Such data would serve the interests of state and federal
governments and allow both to better understand the causes of recurring crises in
the medical malpractice insurance market and formulate the most appropriate
and effective solutions.” Id.
111. HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, CONFRONTING THE NEW HEALTH CARE CRISIS:
IMPROVING HEALTH CARE QUALITY AND LOWERING COSTS BY FIXING OUR MEDICAL
LIABILITY SYSTEM (July 25, 2002), available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/dal
tcp/reports/litrefm.htm.
112. Id. (noting that in 2000 the average cost to defend a medical malpractice
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Furthermore, results from a 1976 study, during a supposed
“medical insurance liability crisis,” indicated that only 8–13% of
filed claims went to trial, with only 1.2–1.9% resulting in a decision
113
for the plaintiff. The Department of Health and Human Services
also referred to a 1987 GAO study, which indicated that 57-70% of
114
Thus, the major
claims resulted in no payment to the patient.
expense for insurance companies is in defending non-meritorious
claims, not unlimited noneconomic damages that may potentially
result from the small number of successful claimants.
3.

Noneconomic Damage Caps Do Not Provide Equal Protection

Almost every state constitution encompasses an equal
115
protection clause similar to the federal constitution.
Statutes
limiting noneconomic damages for medical malpractice claims
violate equal protection because plaintiffs are arbitrarily
116
distinguished from other tort victims.
Capping noneconomic
damages in medical malpractice lawsuits also discriminates against
low-income individuals who are unable to prove large economic
117
damages but nonetheless suffer valid noneconomic damages.
Such noneconomic damage caps result in classifying plaintiffs
based on the severity of the injury: less seriously injured patients
are able to receive full compensation while more seriously injured
118
patients are not able to receive adequate compensation.

claim was $24,669).
113. Id. (citing Jeffrey O’Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability, 60
MINNESOTA: 501-506-509 (1976)).
114. Id. (citing U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE:
CHARACTERISTICS OF CLAIMS CLOSED IN 1984, GAO/HRD-87-55, 18 (Apr. 1987)).
115. Anthony Viorst & Jim Leventhal, Constitutional Challenges to Damage-Cap
Statutes, in ATLA WINTER CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS, ATLA-CLE 515
(Winter 2004). “Equal protection of the laws requires the government to treat
similarly situated persons in a similar matter.” Id.
116. Carol Crocca, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Statutory Provisions Limiting Amount of Recovery in Medical Malpractice Claims, 26
A.L.R. 5th 245 (1995).
117. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, supra note 13 (classifying
low income individuals as “children, the elderly, the disabled, and others who may
not have substantial earnings to establish lost wages”); see also AMERICAN POLITICAL
NETWORK, Statelines Malpractice: AHL Features Developments in Five States, AMERICAN
HEALTH LINE (Aug. 22, 2003). In Texas, consumer advocacy groups and seniors
argued that capping noneconomic damages in medical malpractice lawsuits would
discriminate against low-income individuals because they are unable to prove large
economic damages. Id.
118. See ASSOCIATION OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AMERICA, supra note 13.
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Plaintiffs with valid claims are not the source of the problem; it is
therefore unfair that seriously injured plaintiffs should be deprived
119
of full compensation.
Limiting damages that compensate a
patient for his or her pain and suffering would therefore violate the
basic legal premise that damages should be “sufficient in amount to
indemnify the injured person for the loss suffered and thereby
120
make him or her whole.”
Regardless, some state statutes that limit noneconomic
damages have been upheld under the state constitutional
121
guarantees of equal protection. Some of these statutes have also
been upheld under the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S.
122
Constitution.
In doing so, most courts have employed a rational
123
basis test to review an equal protection challenge to statutory
124
The
damage caps because the caps are economic in nature.
119. Berger, supra note 15, at 184 (explaining that some individuals will be
harmed by noneconomic damage caps). The New Hampshire Supreme Court has
consistently decided that noneconomic damage caps violate the state’s equal
protection clause by distinguishing between classes of tortfeasors. See, e.g.,
Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1236 (N.H. 1991) (focusing on the
distinction “between malpractice victims with noneconomic losses that exceed[ed]
$250,000 and those with less egregious non-economic losses”); Carson v. Maurer,
424 A.2d 825, 837 (N.H. 1980).
120. 25 C.J.S. Damages § 21 (2004). “There is universal agreement that the
compensatory goal of tort law requires that an injured plaintiff be made whole.”
Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057 (Ill. 1997).
121. Crocca, supra note 116 (citing cases that uphold the validity of statutes
that limit noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions); see, e.g., Fein v.
Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985); Mizrahi v. N. Miami Med. Ctr.,
Ltd., 761 So. 2d 1040 (Fla. 2000); Adams v. Children’s Mercy Hosp., 832 S.W.2d
898 (Mo. 1992); Vincent v. Johnson, 833 S.W.2d 859 (Mo. 1992); Robinson v.
Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877 (W. Va. 1991); Zdrojewski v.
Murphy, 657 N.W.2d 721 (Mich. Ct. App. 2002).
122. Hoffman v. United States, 767 F.2d 1431, 1437 (9th Cir. 1985); Mizrahi,
761 So. 2d at 1040.
123. See Berger, supra note 15, at 194 (explaining that the courts agree that the
rational basis test should be used to determine if statutes limiting noneconomic
damage caps have a “real and substantial relationship” to a legitimate state
interest).
124. See Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1435; Fein, 695 P.2d at 679-80; Mizrahi, 761 So. 2d
at 1043; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 738; Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 883. “Most
legislative classifications, including those which involve economic rights, are
subject to a minimal level of scrutiny, the traditional equal protection concept that
the legislative classification will be upheld if it is reasonably related to the
achievement of a legitimate state purpose.” Robinson, 414 S.E.2d at 883; see also
Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43, 71
(Neb. 2003). But see Evans ex rel. Kutch v. State, 56 P.3d 1046, 1052 (Alaska 2002)
(applying a three part “sliding scale” to analyze the right of equal protection
under the Alaska Constitution).
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rational basis test is satisfied if there is (1) a “plausible policy
reason” for the classification of plaintiffs, (2) the legislative facts on
which the classification is based may be considered true by a
governmental decision maker, and (3) the classification in relation
125
to its goal is not arbitrary.
When courts apply the rational basis test, they consistently find
that statutes capping noneconomic damages are in fact rationally
related to the legitimate government purposes of: (1) controlling
126
health care costs and accessibility, or (2) reducing malpractice
127
insurance premiums.
However, these courts failed to conduct a
proper analysis under the rational basis test because the courts did
128
not assess the existence of a medical crisis within the state. Based
on current statistics, limiting noneconomic damage caps is not the
rational response to meet the goals of reducing medical
129
malpractice insurance rates.
Regardless, a court may revere this
130
as judicial fact-finding, and choose not to adopt such reasoning.
The dissenting opinion in Fein v. Permanent Medical Group
agreed with applying the rational basis test, but disagreed with the
level of scrutiny applied under the rational basis test by the
131
majority.
The majority required that the legislation not only
serve a conceivable legislative purpose, but also that each
classification has a “fair and substantial relationship to a legitimate
132
purpose.”
The dissent, however, correctly reasoned that under
125. Gourley, 663 N.W.2d at 71.
126. Mizrahi, 761 N.W.2d at 1043; Zdrojewski, 657 N.W.2d at 739.
127. Hoffman, 767 F.2d at 1437; Fein, 695 P.2d at 680.
128. See Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978) (“When we
examine the legislative purpose of the Act, we find that the incidence of
malpractice claims in North Dakota is far lower than average in the United
States.”); see also Mizrahi, 761 N.W.2d at 1043 (Pariente, J., dissenting) (“There is
no indication that the past medical malpractice crisis continues into the present. .
. . Indeed, it is a ‘settled principle of constitutional law’ that although a statue is
constitutionally valid when enacted, that statute may become constitutionally
invalid due to the changes in the conditions to which the statute applies.”).
129. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 167 (Ala. 1991)
(citing a GAO study suggesting that “the connection between damage caps and
the total cost of health care “is remote, pointing out that, despite statutory reform,
including damage caps, in place for nearly ten years in some states, total medical
malpractice costs for physicians and hospitals rose by more than either the
consumer price index or the medical care index in that period.”); see also supra
Part III.B.2.
130. Gourley ex rel. Gourley v. Neb. Methodist Health Sys., Inc., 663 N.W.2d 43,
55-56 (Neb. 2003).
131. 695 P.2d 665, 691 (Cal. 1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 692.
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the second prong of the analysis the $250,000 damage cap should
have been regarded as “grossly underinclusive” by any standard
133
applied.
Thus there is no rational basis for classifying the most
severely injured patients to pay for the monetary relief to physicians
134
and their medical malpractice insurers.
When courts apply an intermediate test, however, limiting
noneconomic damages has been found to be in violation of some
135
state constitutional guarantees of equal protection.
The
intermediate test employs a higher degree of scrutiny than the
136
rational basis test.
State courts that have employed an
intermediate review have done so because “[a]lthough the right to
recover for personal injuries is not a ‘fundamental right,’ it is
137
nevertheless an important substantive right.”
States are able to
grant individuals more rights than the Federal Constitution
138
requires.
To do so under the intermediate test, the court must
determine (1) “whether the statute has a fair and substantial
relation to this legitimate legislative objective” and (2) “whether it
139
imposes unreasonable restrictions on private rights.”
Using the
intermediate test, the North Dakota Supreme Court concluded that
damage caps preclude full recovery for patients with meritorious
claims, do nothing toward the elimination of nonmeritorious
claims, and actually encourage physicians to practice at the expense
140
Limits on noneconomic
of patients with meritorious claims.
damages should therefore not be upheld under any meaningful
133. Id.
“Although the Legislature normally enjoys wide latitude in
distributing the burdens of personal injuries, the singling out of such a miniscule
and vulnerable group violates even the most undemanding standard of
underinclusiveness.” Id.
134. Id.
135. Crocca, supra note 116 (citing cases that do not uphold the validity of
statutes limiting noneconomic damages in medical malpractice actions); see, e.g.,
Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass’n, 592 So. 2d 156, 169 (Ala. 1991) (concluding that
the legislative goal of lowering insurance costs would not be supported through
noneconomic damage caps because “paid-out damage awards constitute only a
small part of total insurance premium costs”); Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 834
(N.H. 1980) (holding that the statute precluded full recovery for severely injured
plaintiffs, creating classifications among medical malpractice plaintiffs that
unfairly denied such plaintiffs equal protection of the laws).
136. Berger, supra note 15, at 194.
137. Brannigan v. Usitalo, 587 A.2d 1232, 1234 (N.H. 1991) (quoting Carson,
424 A.2d at 830).
138. Carson, 424 A.2d at 831.
139. Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1234 (quoting Carson, 424 A.2d at 832); see also
Moore, 592 So. 2d at 165-66.
140. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978).
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level of judicial scrutiny, even the rational basis test.
The Alabama Supreme Court also correctly determined that
the correlation between noneconomic damage caps and the
141
reduction of health care costs is indirect and remote.
Even
though there is evidence that noneconomic damage caps have a
possible connection to the size of claims, again, they are only one of
142
a multitude of factors.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court has
similarly concluded that there is a weak relationship between the
legislature’s goal of insurance rate reduction and limiting
143
noneconomic damages.
Courts, such as the Illinois and New
Hampshire Supreme Courts, have reminded Congress that the
144
power of remittitur is always available and is the correct judicial
145
tool that should be used in the event of an excessive jury award.
C. Health Care Liability in Minnesota
Minnesota does not impose noneconomic damage caps in
146
Minnesota’s doctors, per 100,000
medical malpractice suits.
141. Moore, 592 So. 2d at 168.
142. Id. at 168-69.
143. See Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1236; Carson, 424 A.2d at 836.
144. Remittitur is the “process by which a court reduces or proposes to reduce
the damages awarded in a jury verdict.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1298 (7th ed.
1999).
145. See Brannigan, 587 A.2d at 1236; Carson, 424 A.2d at 837. If the federal
government enacts legislation to preempt state laws in medical malpractice suits,
then the law may also be challenged on constitutional separation-of-power
grounds. Evans, supra note 94; see also Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d
1057 (Ill. 1997). The American Bar Association advises that courts should use
their powers of remittitur to set aside excessive verdicts, instead of limiting
damages that would not ensure adequate compensation. Evans, supra note 94; see
also Carson, 424 A.2d at 837. Recently, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that
the $500,000 noneconomic damage cap violated the state’s separation of powers
clause by invading the judiciary’s power of remittitur. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1080.
The courts are constitutionally empowered, and indeed obligated, to
reduce excessive verdicts where appropriate in light of the evidence
adduced in a particular case. Section 2-1115.1, however, reduces
damages by operation of law, without regard to the specific
circumstances of individual jury awards. Although legislative limits upon
certain types of damages may be permitted, such as damages recoverable
in statutory causes of action, we hold that the cap in section 2-1115.1
violates the separation of powers clause of the Illinois Constitution.
Id. at 1081. For further discussion of the constitutionality of noneconomic
damages see Kevin J. Gfell, Note, The Constitutional and Economic Implications of a
National Cap on Non-Economic Damages in Medical Malpractice Actions, 37 IND. L. REV.
773 (2004) and Viorst & Leventhal, supra note 115.
146. TABLE 1B, supra note 41; see also MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM, supra note 44.
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county residents, increased from 75 in 1970 to 126 in 2000, a 68%
147
California, with a $250,000 noneconomic damage cap,
increase.
however, has only had a 47.2% increase within the same time
148
period.
The fact is that, caps or no caps, from 1975 to 1986 the
incurred losses for medical malpractice insurers were on the rise in
149
both Minnesota and California.
Incurred losses for medical
malpractice insurers similarly declined drastically in 1986 for
150
Minnesota and did the same in 1988 for California. As previously
concluded, insurance reform caused California’s 1988 decline in
medical malpractice insurance rates, not noneconomic damage
151
caps.
Minnesota’s drastic decline in medical malpractice insurers’
losses was caused by two significant pieces of legislation that passed
in 1986. The first legislation was Minnesota Statutes section
152
145.682, which was explicitly enacted in an effort to remedy
rising costs of medical insurance by reducing frivolous health care
153
Section 145.682 does not limit noneconomic damages,
lawsuits.
but rather requires an affidavit from an expert demonstrating that
154
the expert believes that the plaintiff has a valid claim.
Another
affidavit listing expert witnesses must be served upon the defendant
155
within 180 days after commencement of the suit. The Minnesota
Supreme Court continues to uphold a case dismissal if a plaintiff
156
This
fails to obtain sufficient certification of expert review.
147. TABLE 1B, supra note 41.
148. TABLE 1A, supra note 38.
149. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 21 (Figure 6: Inflation-Adjusted
Incurred Losses for Medical Malpractice Insurers in Seven Selected States, 19752001).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
152. MINN. STAT. § 145.682 (2002).
153. Leo, supra note 5, at 1404-05.
154. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 2. “At a minimum, a ‘meaningful disclosure’
is required [for] setting forth the standard of care, the act or omissions violating
that standard, and the chain of causation.” Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645
N.W.2d 420, 430 (Minn. 2002).
155. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subd. 4 (2002). The statute requires an affidavit
listing the expert witnesses whom the plaintiff may call to testify as to issues of
malpractice causation, the substance of their testimony, and a summary of the
grounds for each witness’ opinion. Id. The attorney and each expert witness must
sign the affidavit. Id.
156. See Teffeteller, 645 N.W.2d at 431. The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld
the trial court’s holding that the physician’s affidavit failed to meet the statutory
requirements and dismissal with prejudice was appropriate. Id. The court has also
upheld a district court holding that “respondent failed to file a sufficient affidavit
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legislation effectively remedied the expense of defending against
frivolous lawsuits and should be utilized by other states prior to
157
jumping to noneconomic damages caps.
A major factor assessed in the American Medical Association’s
determination of whether or not a state is in medical liability crisis
158
is the magnitude of patients losing access to health care.
The
second piece of significant Minnesota legislation approved in 1986
addressed this issue by establishing rural hospital financial
159
assistance grants.
This rural health initiative required the
commissioner of health, through the office of rural health, to
provide financial assistance to rural hospitals that were in danger of
160
closing without such assistance.
Unfortunately, on June 5, 2003,
the Minnesota Legislature repealed the statute providing financial
161
assistance to rural hospitals.
Notably, Minnesota’s largest insurance company’s medical
liability insurance rates for general surgeons only increased by 2%
162
from 1999 to 2002, compared to a 75% increase in Florida and a
163
Despite these favorable statistics
130% increase in Pennsylvania.
in Minnesota, Minnesota has somehow been classified by the AMA
164
as a state showing “problem signs” in the area of medical liability.
Even with Minnesota’s success in reducing frivolous lawsuits and
past assistance for hospitals in rural areas, health care reform bills
were active in the 2003-04 regular session and biennial budget
session. On February 20, 2003, H.F. 482 was introduced in the
Minnesota House of Representatives, had a first reading, and was

within the 180-day deadline and that failure to comply results in mandatory
dismissal upon motion.” Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 577
(Minn. 1999). When the plaintiff fails to comply with the 180-day requirement,
each cause of action for which expert testimony is required must be dismissed
upon defendant’s motion. Stroud v. Hennepin County Med. Ctr., 556 N.W.2d
552, 555 (Minn. 1996).
157. See Dan Oberdorfer, State Taking the Steps to Limit Excessive Jury Awards,
STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), Apr. 21, 1986, at 1A. “[T]he Minnesota
Medical Association found that 60% of all malpractice claims are closed with no
money paid out.” Id.
158. Blaney-Koen, supra note 53.
159. MINN. STAT. § 144.1484 (1986) (repealed 2003).
160. MINN. STAT. § 144.1483 (1986) (repealed subd. 3, 2003).
161. 2003 Minn. Laws, ch. 13, art. 7, § 89.
162. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 3. “The resulting 2002 premium rate
quoted by the Florida insurer was $174,300 a year, more than seventeen times the
$10,140 premium rate quoted by the insurer in Minnesota.” Id.
163. IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 9.
164. MEDICAL LIABILITY REFORM , supra note 44.
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165

referred to the Civil Law Committee.
Its companion Senate bill,
S.F. 459, was also introduced, had a first reading, and was referred
166
to the Judiciary Committee.
Both House and Senate bills
proposed limits of $250,000 for noneconomic damages in an action
for injury or death against a health care provider, but neither
167
passed. Noneconomic damages would inevitably include all non168
pecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable. In 2005, the
Minnesota Legislature is considering a $250,000 cap on
noneconomic damages in actions for injury or death against a
169
health care provider.
Even though medical malpractice insurance rates are low and
the supply of physicians is increasing, the legislature may be
considering tort reform because “rising health care costs and
health coverage has again become a critical issue for
170
Minnesotans.”
The legislature may also be reacting to President
Bush’s national push on tort reform or the recent withdrawal of St.
171
Paul Companies from the medical malpractice insurance market.
Minnesota’s St. Paul Companies, at one time the largest medical
malpractice insurer in the country, stopped selling malpractice
172
insurance nationwide in December of 2001.
The chairman and
chief executive officer of St. Paul Companies blamed recent market
165. H.R. 452, 83rd Leg. (Minn. 2003). H.F. 452 was authored by Minnesota
House Representatives Lipman, Kohls, DeLaforest, Gerlach, Holberg, et al.
166. S.F. 459, 83rd Leg. (Minn. 2003). S.F. 459 was authored by Minnesota
Senators Michel, LeClair, and Kiscaden.
167. H.R. 452, § 4, subd. 2; S.F. 459, § 4 subd. 2.
168. H.R. 452, § 4, subd. 1; S.F. 459, § 4, subd. 1 (defining noneconomic loss as
“all non pecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable, including but not
limited to pain, disability, disfigurement, embarrassment, emotional distress, and
loss of consortium”).
169. H.F. No. 2, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) (introduced, had a first reading, and
referred to the Health Policy & Finance Committee on January 6, 2005); S.F. No.
0376, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005) (introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the
Health and Security Family Committee on January 19, 2005). In addition, the
Minnesota Legislature is considering a resolution to support President Bush’s
policy on medical liability tort reform. See H.F. No. 1029, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005)
(introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the Civil Law and Elections
Committee on February 14, 2005); S.F. No. 1107, 84th Leg. (Minn. 2005)
(introduced, had a first reading, and referred to the Judiciary Committee on
February 21, 2005).
170. MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC HEALTH, THE JOINT TASK FORCE ON
HEALTH COSTS AND QUALITY, at http://www.health.state.mn.us/divs/hpsc/hep
/JTF/ jtfintro.htm (last updated June 24, 2004).
171. MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, BUSH PROPOSES MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
REFORM (2003), at http://www.mnmed.org/News/fullstory.cfm?recNum=2596.
172. Id.; see also MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, supra note 34.
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173

trends.
Even though St. Paul Companies provided insurance
nationally, medical malpractice insurance rates depend on varying
compositions of insurance, legal, and health care structures within
174
a state.
Minnesota has a history of social consciousness and leadership
175
Minnesota should not consider
in health care matters.
noneconomic damage caps in any tort reform plan because of
Minnesota’s current success in patient accessibility and low medical
malpractice rates. However, due to the recent repeal of financial
aid to rural hospitals, Minnesota should continue to monitor access
to health care in rural areas.
D. Considerations for Future Legislation
Whether under the Federal or State legislative umbrella,
capping noneconomic damages will not solve the medical
insurance liability crisis. All legislators should seriously consider
how noneconomic damage caps would affect the health care
176
system.
Even if noneconomic damage caps would influence
lower medical malpractice insurance rates for physicians, the caps
may in turn increase health insurance costs for the public because
177
they are the potential victims of medical negligence.
Any
legislative solution should include (1) a process to reduce the
incidence of medical malpractice by physicians, (2) assessment of
insurance regulation as to how insurance rates are set, and (3) a
process to reduce the number of frivolous medical malpractice
178
cases.

173. MINNESOTA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, ST. PAUL COS. TO DROP MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE BUSINESS, at http://www.mmaonline.net/News/fullstory.cfm?rec
Num=2197 (last visited Jan. 19, 2005).
174. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 46. GAO concluded, and the
National Association of Insurance Commissioner’s Director of Research
concurred, that “medical malpractice markets are not national in nature, but vary
widely with regard to their insurance markets, regulatory framework, legal
environment, and health care structures” within the states. Id.
175. Keith Halleland & Deanna Mills, Beyond Band-Aids, STAR TRIBUNE
(Minneapolis- St. Paul), Oct. 7, 2002, at D3.
176. CENTER FOR STUDYING HEALTH SYSTEM CHANGE, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
INSURANCE
FALLOUT
VARIES
ACROSS
COMMUNITIES
(2003),
at
http://www.hschange.com/ CONTENT/606/.
177. Carson v. Mauer, 424 A.2d 825, 835 (N.H. 1980).
178. Martha Kessler, Connecticut: Governor Calls For Lawmakers to Adopt Cap on
Noneconomic Malpractice Awards, in BNA’S HEALTH CARE DAILY REPORT (Sept. 17,
2003).
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Minnesota has addressed these issues in the following ways.
First, Minnesota has peer review organizations intact to reduce the
179
incidence of medical malpractice. The purpose of peer review is
to assure that discussion of medical errors occurs without threat of
180
Secondly, the Minnesota Department
medical malpractice suits.
of Commerce regulates the insurance industry through a file and
181
use system. In 2001, the Department of Commerce introduced a
“speed to market” filing procedure for insurance companies that
182
meet certain requirements.
Third, Minnesota requires expert
affidavits to limit frivolous lawsuits, which contributed to the drastic
183
decline in medical liability insurers’ losses in 1986.
Even though these measures have aided in reducing medical
malpractice insurance rates in Minnesota, such measures should be
reassessed as compositions of insurance, legal, and health care
structures change over time. Each state should make similar
assessments to create the proper balance of tort and insurance
reform to decrease medical malpractice insurance rates. Many tort
reform alternatives are available: abolish collateral source
payments, abolish “joint and several liability,” restrict the statute of
limitations, allow periodic payment of damages, limit attorney fees,
require expert certification of claims, and provide for greater use
184
of arbitration.
IV. CONCLUSION
Legislatures have legitimate concerns about the health care
delivery system, but the panacea of the “medical liability crisis” does
not lie in capping noneconomic damages. The federal government
should not cap noneconomic damages because: (1) states are in
the best position to regulate health care, (2) statistics show that
noneconomic damages are not the determinate factor in increasing
medical liability insurance rates, and (3) caps do not provide equal
protection by limiting compensation of medical malpractice
victims. Even at the state level, noneconomic damage caps should
179. MINN. STAT. §§ 145.61-67 (2003). The review organizations “share
information for the purpose of identifying and analyzing trends in medical error
and iatrogenic injury.” MINN. STAT. § 145.61 (q).
180. In re Fairview Univ. Med. Ctr., 590 N.W.2d 150, 153 (Minn. Ct. App.
1999).
181. MULTIPLE FACTORS, supra note 11, at 61.
182. Id.
183. See supra Part III.C.
184. See IMPLICATIONS, supra note 6, at 11-12.
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not be a part of tort reform legislation. A small number of severely
injured victims should not have to suffer so that medical
malpractice insurance rates will decrease. Other insurance and tort
reform measures should be utilized to protect physicians against
frivolous lawsuits and provide full compensation for those injured
in rare cases of physician negligence.
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